The other day, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
established an intelligence building with the most leading-edge
technology of preventing espionage. It seems that the ministry
has recognized for the first time its defenselessness against
espionage. As is often said, "it is quite easy to steal
information from Japan" ("New Building" 1). Against this
background, there was the fact that the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) wiretapped conversations between Japanese auto
executives and trade chief Ryutaro Hashimoto at the height of
trade talks last spring.
In the editorial, "Bar CIA's economic spying", the author says
that since the Cold War was over, the activities of the CIA have
been changing, and now its targets include economic matters like
trade talks on the automobile industry with Japan. Backed up by
President Bill Clinton, the agency is trying to give advantage to
the United States. But as this editorial's author points out, the
spying on economic matters by the CIA is meaningless because it
has little knowledge of economy ("Bar CIA's economic spying" 6).
While we have to recognize that the intervention in economic
matters is essential for the CIA to survive in a sense, the CIA
was originally formed for purposes of getting military
information of the Soviet Union, so I agree with the author's
opinion that the CIA should not spy in economic matters.
To know how the CIA's activities have changed since the Cold
War has ended, I need to describe the background of the
establishment of the CIA. After World War II, the U.S. needed to
get information about the ability and intentions of the former
Soviet Union (Volkman 33). At that time, relations between the
U.S. and the former Soviet Union were already tense, and they
were continuing awkward arguments over the loan of the weapons to
other countries. Nevertheless, the U.S. had little knowledge of
the ability of the scientific techniques or the scale of the army
of the Soviet Union (Volkman 32). In such a situation, President
Truman formed the CIA as a new concentrated intelligence service
and charged it with the collection and the analysis of any
military information (Volkman 37, 38).
The author shows the vagueness of the purposes of the recent
CIA's activities: "the CIA has not made a convincing case why it
should start from almost no base to build a center for economic
intelligence and analysis when the government can hire outside
experts or look to agencies like the Treasury Department that
already have more knowledgeable staffs" ("Bar CIA's economic
spying" 6). The CIA itself does not understand what to do because
of the collapse of the Soviet Union ("Bar CIA's economic spying"
6). The author says that one of the reasons why the CIA spies in
economic matters is "to protect a large budget and staff," and
that this skews its motivation for its activities ("Bar CIA's
economic spying" 6).
I agree with the author's idea that the purposes of the recent
CIA's activities are vague because the CIA has lost the main
purpose of its activities following the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Ironically, the CIA could not be glad of the collapse of
the Soviet Union because it was going to lose the reason for its
existence ("Watch the world" 58). It has to be reorganized, and
it is groping for a new purpose for its activities. The recent
spying on economic matters is one of the ways to survive ("Watch
the world" 59). At the same time the CIA collects economic
information about other countries, including its allies. It has
started to control industrial espionage by spying on other
countries for the sake of U.S. enterprises ("Suspicion of
wiretapping" 3). These are the conversion of tactics for the CIA
for survival, but these activities have been making the relations
between the U.S. and the other countries worse ("Suspicion of
wiretapping" 3). It is a big problem for the U.S., especially in
the relationship with Japan. The U.S. and Japan are both great
economic nations and important partners with each other in terms
of economy, politics or security. So the CIA has to stop the
activities which worsen the relations between the U.S. and Japan
and excite the people of both countries.
The author also explains how unnecessary it is to spy in
economic matters: "over the long run, U.S. access to Japanese
markets is not likely to be improved by spying on the Japanese
trade ministry" ("Bar CIA's economic spying" 6). William Casey,
the director of Central Intelligence in the Reagan
administration, often said that when he needed to get information
about economic matters, he would always ask someone who was
familiar with economics and never depended on the CIA ("Bar CIA's
economic spying" 6). As a matter of course, the author points out
that "banks, brokerage houses and other financial institutions
have far more experience and expertise in tracking bond markets,
currency fluctuations, inflation rates and budget deficits" ("Bar
CIA's economic spying" 6).
I agree with the author's opinion that the CIA's spying on
economic matters is unnecessary because the CIA has brought
little profit to the U.S. government in terms of economy in the
past 20 years. Actually, the CIA has been spying in the economic
field in Japan since the latter half of the 1970's. When the
trade negotiation had a hard time in the Carter administration,
the CIA sent a spy to Japan and collected information, but after
the negotiation we could not see any loss of the Japanese economy
by the espionage ("The walls have cars" 30, 31). Besides, in the
auto talks between U.S. and Japan last spring, trade chief
Hashimoto recognized that the negotiation resulted in his
satisfaction, though the CIA had wiretapped the conversations
("The walls have ears" 30). A trade official said, "even if the
wiretapping was a fact, I don't think it influenced on the
negotiation in substance" ("The walls have ears" 30). Chief
Cabinet Secretary Koken Nosaka also said that "Tokyo is satisfied
with the outcome of the auto talks, in which Tokyo's desire not
to include numerical targets was well reflected" ("Tokyo to Seek"
6). As this evidence shows, as long as the U.S. government
deepens on the CIA to get information when it has to solve an
economic problem, it cannot get profit.
The same as NATO, which is losing the significance of its
existence by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CIA is asked
the purpose of its activities. The CIA is now looking for "new
business" and "turning its spying machinery" on economic matters.
But as William Casey often said, "he would ask a businessman, not
an intelligence analyst, whenever he wanted economic
intelligence," it is foolish for the CIA to be involved in
economic matters ("Bar CIA's economic spying" 6). Therefore, the
author emphasizes that the CIA should not concern itself with
economic matters as the main purpose of its activities ("Bar
CIA's economic spying" 6). For the U.S., the CIA is necessary to
get important information of other countries, but I think the CIA
should not function in the matters that will worsen the relations
with the other countries.
by Mizuki Kogure
Works Cited
"Bar CIA's Economic Spying. " Editorial. Asahi Evening
News. October 23, 1995: 6.
Volkman, Ernest. Warriors of the Night-Spies, Soldiers,
and American Intelligence. New York: William Morrow &
Company, 1985.
"The New Building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
Completed." Yomiuri Shimbun. November 21, 1995:
1.
Nobuhiko, Ochiai. Watch the World. Tokyo: Shueisha,
1992.
"Suspicion of Wiretapping." Yomiuri Shimbun. October
18, 1995: 3.
"The Walls have Ears." Newsweek. November 1, 1995:
30-31
"Tokyo to Seek to Verify If CIA Spied on Car Talks." The
Japan Times. November 17, 1995: 6.
