The April 1996 Hashimoto-Clinton Joint Declaration on
Security reaffirmed the importance of the Japan-US. Alliance and
set certain policies in motion. One of these policies--a review
of the 1978 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation-- represented a
successful action that should have taken long before. Other
elements of the Joint Declaration addressed new security issues,
such as relationships with an increasingly powerful China and the
role of multilateral security structure (Green 1).
The New Guidelines for Defense Cooperation which was decided
and announced on September24, 1997 was based on the contents of
the Joint Declaration on Security. The new guidelines cleared the
way for Japan to play a military role in regional conflicts and
the military cooperative relationship between Japan and U.S.
(Skelton 1). Japans neighboring countries showed various
reactions to the new guidelines. I want to analyze the reactions
China, North and South Korea and South East Asia.
Analysis
China
- China reacted to the New Guidelines strongly. Chinese Foreign
Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang said that China hoped the
Japan-US. Security Treaty was only the relationship between Japan
and U.S., and expressed anxiety over enlarging the role of the
security alliance between these two countries (Iiyama 2; Japan
Pact 1). And a Beijing spokesman made a statement that any act
which included directly or indirectly the Taiwan Straits in the
framework of the New Guidelines was an interference in and
violation against China's sovereignty (Skelton 1).
There was a point in common between these comments. It was
that China feared Taiwan was integrated into the area that the
New Guidelines categorized "the area around Japan in case of
emergency." The reason was that China was afraid that Japan
and U.S. narrowed China's actions in case of emergency,
especially Taiwan (Yamada 44).
Reacting to China's declarations, Japan and U.S. stated
clearly that the areas to be covered which was defined by the new
guidelines were "situational" not "geographical" and did not
target any country (Shibata 1; Skelton 1). To regard "the area
around Japan in case of emergency" as "situational" was so
ambiguous that the New Guidelines made China not stimulate
unnecessarily (Green 5).
-
North and South Korea
- South Korea set a high valuation on the new guidelines,
because the new guidelines specified that Japan kept only
self-defense policy and the three antinuclear principles within
the scope of the Constitution of Japan (Ito 2). On the other
hand, North Korea was offended by the New Guidelines such as
China.
Why did North and South Korea react to the New Guidelines in
direct opposition? The reason was that the New Guidelines
indicated that U.S. was prepared for coping firmly with North
Korea's advance southward, and strengthened the deterrent to
North Korea. U.S. got to take more effective measures to cope
with the Korean Peninsula in case of emergency by Japan's back
regional supports (Amacost 5). The New Guidelines implied that
Japan would cooperate with U.S. and South Korea and attack
indirectly North Korea in case of emergency in the Korean
Peninsula. Japan and U.S. got to cope with not only North Korea's
advance southward but also any unexpected case of emergency in
the Korean Peninsula by taking measures which were researched in
detail. The reason was that the New Guidelines made the Japan and
U.S. consultation closer than the 1978 Guidelines (Amacost 5).
Owing to the New Guidelines, North and South Korea would keep the
balance for a while.
-
South East Asia
- The Philippine President Ramos declared that Philippine gave
a welcome to the New Guidelines. The reason was that the New
Guidelines could make Japan act more positive role in regional
security. Ramos grasped that the New Guidelines were the
institution of Japan's role and the regional participation of
U.S. (Yamamoto 4).
The regional participation of U.S. was very important for
South East Asia, because most of the South East Asian countries
regarded it as the core of the Asia and Pacific's peace and
independence. Therefore, Ramos said that the importance of the
U.S. army's existence in Asia and Pacific area would have been a
determinant for from fifteen to twenty-five years to come
(Yamamoto 4).
South East Asia could not help ignoring China. China was the
threat and the important existence for South East Asia, however,
it was not necessary for South East Asia to challenge China to a
fight openly. There was a case in point. Kensuke Ebata, a
military analyst, reported as follows: "Singapore established the
supply office of the seventh U.S. fleet in Singapore's naval
base. Though, Singapore tried not to make the existence of the
U.S. supply office public" (Ebata 226). Why did the Singapore
government want to conceal the U.S. supply office in her land?
The reason was that Singapore thought over the delicate political
balance in South East Asia, that was, China's influence on South
East Asia. Taking account of the condition, it was no wonder that
South East Asia expected and evaluate highly the New
Guidelines.
Conclusion
What should Japan do after the enactment of the New
Guidelines? As mentioned earlier, China and North Korea felt
antipathy against and anxiety over the New Guidelines. Japan
should try to make China and North Korea deepen their
understanding of the contents of the New Guidelines. The
Japan-US. alliance including the New Guidelines was indispensable
to keep the stability of Asia and Pacific in military, political
and economical aspects. Therefore, the New Guidelines must not
disturb the stability of Asia and the Pacific region. That was,
the contents and aim of the New Guidelines must be cleared. What
Japan should do for the future was that to try to make Japan's
neighboring countries have a right understanding of the New
Guidelines and to realize the contents of the New Guidelines in
early stage.
by Takashi Kawaguchi
Works Cited
Amacost, Michael. "Editorial." Yomiuri
Shinbun Sep. 19, 1997: 5.
Ebata, Kensuke. Japan's Security (Trans.)
Tokyo: Koudansha, 1997.
Green, Michael. "Editorial." Yomiuri Shinbun
Sep. 21, 1997 :5.
Green, Michael J. "A Policy Memorandum." http://www.us-japan.org/jasw/article1/html
Iiyama, Masashi. "Editorial." Yomiuri
Shinbun Sep. 24, 1997 :2.
Ito, Akihiro. "Editorial." Yomiuri
Shinbun Sep. 24, 1997 :2.
Japan Pact. "Japan, U.S. to Announce Framework for
Pact." http://www.carleton.ca/~shick/water.htm
Shibata, Takashi. "Editorial." Yomiuri Shinbun
Sep. 24, 1997 :1.
Skelton, Russell. "Pact gives Tokyo stronger military
role." The Sydney Morning Herald Sep. 25, 1997:
1.
Yamada, Gen. "The New Guidelines and China."
Securitarian Aug. 1997 :44.
Yamamoto, Shuya. "Editorial." Sankei
Shinbun Oct. 15, 1997: 4.
