Nuclear proliferation has become one of the most serious
issues in the post-Cold War era. Although the danger of
nuclear-war between the USSR and US has been decreased, the
third-world countries now have interests in becoming nuclear
powers in order to hold regional hegemony (Imai 4; translation
mine). However, it is so obvious no country could survive the
nuclear war that some specific countries seem to develop nuclear
weapon for a different purpose. Destroying an enemy country by
nuclear weapon is no longer the goal, but gaining political power
is. In today's international society, even the suspicion of
holding nuclear weapon can become a strong advantage in politics,
a device for international influence. The issue in DPRK
(Democratic People's of Republic Korea) is one of good example.
It uses the suspicion of developing nuclear for achieving its
ultimate purpose--"Soft Landing" which has the three (3) main
points
- Approval of Kim IL Song - Kim John IL system by the international
society, and its promise not to interfere in the
domestic affairs of the DPRK;
- Assuring security by not using nuclear weapon against the DPRK;
- Getting as much financial assistance as the DPRK could get
(Ogawa 82; translation mine).
The goal of this essay is to analyze the use of nuclear
weapons as a political device by examining the DPRK's practice.
First, I will show the US-DPRK Framework Agreement in 1994, which
brought the DPRK lots of benefits because of the suspicion.
Second, I will show how the DPRK uses its nuclear development
suspicion against South Korea. Finally, I will analyze what kind
of effects the nuclear weapon has on its domestic matter.
It was 1990 that the DPRK started to be suspected of nuclear
development. The DPRK was one of the member states of NPT (Non
Proliferation Treaty) at that time; however, it refused to accept
IAEF's (International Atomic Energy Agency) inspection even
though it was required for the NPT member states. American
satellites found one plant for reprocessing used nuclear fuel in
Yongbyong, DPRK was working. This meant that it was producing
plutonium, the chief component of the nuclear weapon.
Consequently, the international pressure against the DPRK
increased in order to let the IAEA inspect the nuclear facilities
in the DPRK.
The DPRK insisted that the threat by nuclear weapons, located
in South Korea under the US's control, was the reason that it
refused the inspection. Then the DPRK demanded that South Korea
should remove its nuclear weapon from its own land. No Teu, the
South Korean president who responded to the claim, was succeeded
in declaring de-nuclearization in South Korea with the US's
consent. This movement led the "Cooperated Declaration Concerning
De-nuclealization in Korean Peninsula" between the two Koreas in
1991.
Since the DPRK had no more excuses for avoiding IAEF's
inspection, it signed the IAEA Safeguard Agreement on January
1992 and ratified it in the following year. Because of this, the
DPRK made the opening report of present nuclear substance, which
is subject to IAEF's safeguard measure and is a duty of the
Member State of the IAEA. In the report, there was no mention of
the 2 nuclear facilities located near Yongbyong.
Based on the report, the IAEA made specified inspections 6
times. They investigated the amount of the extracted plutonium;
however, the result that they got from the research didn't
coincide with that of the opening report made by the DPRK. Thus,
they started be suspicious of nuclear development. Although the
IAEA tried to make a special inspection at the two unreported
nuclear facilities near Yongbyong, the DPRK government refused
it. Since the IAEA submitted this issue to the Security Council,
the DPRK got angry and declared its withdrawal from NPT on March
1993 and from IAEA on June 1994. The Korean Peninsula was in a
critical situation at that time.
It might be the US that was worried about this situation the
most. The US, a leading country of NPT-IAEA system, would have
thought that the DPRK's withdrawal was "the threat to the world
in point that it was the challenge against NPT-IAEA system"
(Morimoto 153; translation mine). They also might have worried
that "if the DPRK withdrew from NPT and IAEA, this global
non-nuclear proliferation system would be destroyed" (Morimoto
154; translation mine). NPT and IAEA were both established for
controlling the nuclear and nuclear weapon to maintain
international security. NPT, which is signed by almost all major
countries except India and Pakistan, is often criticized for its
mechanism that perpetuates the nuclear Powers' vested interests
and its inequalities. Yet it still remains true that we have no
alternative right now. The DPRK's withdrawal definitely disclosed
a flaw of NPT, and the US had to take measures.
The US's answer was former president Carter's visit to the
DPRK in1994. We can say it was a great achievement for the DPRK
since it never had high officials from the U.S. before. There is
a great gap in economics and politics between the two. Just think
about how different their GNPs are. For the DPRK, Carter's visit
was a great honor which it could improve its status in the
international society and even among its people.
In Carter-Kim IL Song Conference, Carter agreed that the US government would
stop the sanctions, which were going to be applied
by UN, with qualifications. Kim IL Song said that
the DPRK would freeze the program for developing
nuclear if the US promised the following points:
- Opening the third round of the US-DPRK high official conference
- US's support for founding the light water reactors
- No use of nuclear weapons by the US and other countries
Without the suspicion, the DPRK could not have made the US
agree these points above.
Carter's visit led the negotiation concerning DPRK's nuclear development between
the US and the DPRK, so called the third round US-DPRK
high official conference the following year. Although
Kim IL Song died while the negotiation being held
in Geneva and it stopped for a while, both countries
finally reached the mutual agreement, so called
US-DPRK Framework Agreement in 1994. The highlights
of the agreement is as follows:
- DPRK will
-
- Allow the IAEA to resume ad hoc and routine inspection of facilities not covered
by the nuclear freeze when the Supply Agreement
is signed;
- Remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon and
allow implementation of its safeguards agreement
under this Treaty.
- USA will
-
- Provide two light-water-reactor (LWR) units with a total generating capacity
of approximately 2,000 MW (e) to the DPRK
on a turnkey basis;
- Provide an alternative energy (At most 500,000 ton crude petroleum a year).
- Others
-
- Normalization of the relationship between the US and the DPRK;
- Assurance of not using nuclear weapon against the DPRK. (JNC; translation
mine)
We can see the tremendous benefit the DPRK gained in exchange
for the acceptance of IAEF's inspection and agreement to remain
in NPT. The highlight of the agreement is the supply of
light-water-reactors for the DPRK, and the DPRK received them at
virtually no cost. We never know if the DPRK was actually
developing the nuclear or not at that time. The DPRK could have
pretended that it really had a nuclear weapon in order to scare
the international society and to open the negotiation in which
the DPRK has a clear advantage over the others.
In this case, the DPRK is said to have "plutonium which could
be converted into 4 to 7 atomic bombs" (Momimoto 135; translation
mine). So the suspicion of nuclear development would have been
based on the truth. However, the mere suspicion did actually
contributed to the national interest of the DPRK. We can say that
the US-DPRK Framework Agreement is the victory of the DPRK in the
points that it achieved two purposes of "Soft Landing"---a
security assurance that nuclear weapon s would not be used
against the DPRK, and a very considerable amount of financial
assistance. It is the nuclear weapons that enable the DPRK to get
this achievement.
This issue concerning light water reactors is still going on.
The light water reactors are now being built by KEDO (Korean
Energy Development Organization), the agency which is financed
mostly by the US, South Korea, Japan; however, it often becomes a
political issue of the sponsors.
Here is an example. Last October, the DPRK launched a missile
(the DPRK insists it was a satellite, though) that went over
Japan. This incident frightened the Japanese people. The Japanese
government was badly held up in reporting the news, disclosing
its lack of ability for crisis control. The Diet accepted the
resolution criticizing the DPRK's launch of missile unanimously,
and it had decided to stop its assistance for KEDO.
Nevertheless, Japanese government reopened the assistance for
KEDO on October 20, only after 2 months that they declared to
stop the assistance. We might wonder why they did so. Some people
might think that the government should have had a coherent policy
in order to call on the DPRK to reflect on its conduct, and
others would have regretted the corruption of Japanese politics.
However, Japanese government did not reopen the assistance
spontaneously nor positively. They had enough reasons. The US and
South Korea strongly urged Japan to do so. If KEDO stopped its
assistance to the DPRK, the DPRK would have enough pretexts to
start developing nuclear weapons again. The US and South Korea
were afraid of that kind of situation happening. And Japan, which
was also afraid of being criticized by foreign countries for
giving the DPRK an incentive to start nuclear development again,
decided to reopen the assistance for KEDO a day before the 4
lateral conference (DPRK, US, China, South Korea) started (Asahi
Shimbun).
I do not think what the Japanese government did was wrong.
After the launching of the missile, the Japanese government had
no recourse but to halt assistance to the DPRK. Likewise, their
reason for restarting assistance is also well taken. However, I
have to say it is true that the conduct made by the Japanese
government left an impression that Japanese gave in to the DPRK's
strong attitude. Most people would not have understood the
reasons behind. Overall, the DPRK succeeded in making a use of
suspicion against Japan in this case, too.
I have thus far described the effect of the suspicion of
nuclear development referring to the US-DPRK Framework Agreement.
Next, I will show another issue where we can see the effect of
the suspicion. It is the issue of unification of Korean
Peninsula. The suspicion also contributes to the DPRK's foreign
policy toward South Korea.
Morimoto says that one of the goals of the DPRK is to unite
the Korean Peninsula by its initiative (159; translation mine).
On the other hand, another expert observes that: "In all aspects
except the nuclear field, the competition between the North and
the South is over. The South has outperformed the North both
economically and politically. The South's economy ranks fifteenth
in the world in terms of GNP and thirteenth in trade volume.
Although its politics remain volatile, the South has wrought a
functioning democracy" (Byung-joon 97). So the nuclear
development is the DPRK's last resort as it thought about
reunification.
Actually, it was South Korea that caused the DPRK to have an
incentive to develop nuclear weapons. It is said that the DPRK
determined its nuclear development in the early 80s, influenced
by the nuclear development program proposed by Pak Administration
in South Korea. The Cold War was about to end at that time. The
relationship between the DPRK and the former USSR was cooling
off; on the other hand, South Korea, the USSR, and China improved
their relations. Since the DPRK could no longer depend on the
USSR's nuclear deterrent, it needed to have a deterrent itself
(Morimoto 158; translation mine). Since strengthening
conventional weapons is costly, the nuclear weapon was the only
alternative for the DPRK when it thought about its weak
economics. In short, the changes of circumstances in Northeast
Asia made the DPRK think about nuclear development.
Since the DPRK started developing nuclear weapons, it has
negotiated with the US skillfully. Morimoto says it is obvious
that the DPRK think that the dialogue with the US is most
important (Bouei 66; translation mine). He also mentions that the
DPRK has been slowly sneaking into the international society
through the US, and at the same time, it has been planning to
take the initiative in Korean Peninsula, ignoring South Korea
(Bouei 68; translation mine).
Hence it is no wonder that South Korea feels unhappy about the
DPRK's such attitude. Byung-joon Ahn, a professor of politics in
the Yonsei University in Korea, says the DPRK "has treated its
relations with the South as necessary only to the extent that
they improve relations with the United States. As long as South
Korea remains fearful of being left out of an issue in which it
possesses such vital stakes, relations with both the North and
the United States are bound to deteriorate"(105). The DPRK has
been seeking to maneuver itself between the United States and the
South. By doing so, the DPRK can reduce the pressure put by the
US and South Korea, and promote its status over South Korea.
Thus, the DPRK will be able to take the initiative in the
unification. Although it is unlikely that this situation will
happen, it is no good for the US to forget South Korea's presence
when they talk about the nuclear issue. The nuclear issue in the
DPRK has more important meaning for South Korea, the neighboring
country. The US should pay attention to South Korea's opinion.
The US has to be careful not to be caught in a trap of the DPRK;
the trap made out of the suspicion of nuclear weapons. So far, we
have seen the effect of nuclear weapon used for foreign policy.
However, its effect can also be utilized for domestic matters. In
this final section, I will analyze the domestic effect of the
nuclear weapon.
As we know, the suspicion of developing nuclear of course
attracted a considerable attention from all over the world since
it was an obvious challenge to the NPT-IAEA system. For better or
worse, the DPRK has succeeded in getting international attention.
Aside from our anxiety, the DPRK government energetically
propagandized this domestically in order to boost nationalism. I
suppose that nationalism is indispensable to the DPRK. Without
nationalism, the people of the DPRK can not be united in the
place where the people earn and produce little, eat little, and
the political behavior of the people is strictly observed. The
nuclear weapon was thus utilized by the DPRK to boost nationalism
and to stand up to the developed countries.
The other domestic effect concerns Kim John IL himself.
According to Morimoto, "it is required for Kim John IL, a new
leader in the DPRK, to show his ability as a leader as he
wrestles with the issue, the continuation of the system" (Bouei
65). The suspicion of holding nuclear weapon is now being used
for the leader to take a political initiative within the country.
Maybe Kim John IL thought that it would be definitely necessary
to get a support from the military authorities, and determined to
appeal his nuclear policy to them (Morimoto, Post 158;
translation mine).
I have analyzed the political effect of having nuclear weapons
or the suspicion of developing them from the 3 stages: US-DPRK
Framework Agreement, the DPRK's attitude toward South Korea in
the case of unification, and finally, the domestic effect. The
DPRK as a third-world country proved the merit of having a
nuclear weapon. What we are afraid of is that other third
countries will follow after the DPRK. As we know, both India and
Pakistan did a nuclear test last June, revealing flaws in
NPT-IAEA system once again. It is no wonder if there are other
countries which would be interested in doing things like India
and Pakistan. Even though some countries hesitate to test nuclear
weapons, they still may have an interest in having a "suspicion"
of holding it just like the DPRK.
In the long run, what can we do toward this issue, the
proliferation of nuclear weapon in the third world? There would
be no best, even collect answer to it. However, from my point of
view, strengthening the NPT-IAEA system is the best remedy for
it. Although there is lots of flaws in present NPT-IAEA system,
it is true that there is no alternative system now. Besides,
creating new system is a lot of work; we have no time to discuss
it. What is important is to reconsider the problems within the
system, and to improve them, not just start from the beginning or
blaming it. In present situation, five nuclear powers are not
acting toward reducing nuclear weapon cooperatively. Some nuclear
powers are hesitating to do so. Instead of recognizing the vested
interests of nuclear powers, they have to sincerely respond to
the non-nuclear powers. They have to guarantee the security of
those countries. It is the requirements stated in the Article 6
of the Non- Proliferation Treaty. Without the nuclear powers'
sincere and spontaneous action, they would be caught in the
dilemma that they themselves made. The issue of the DPRK was just
a beginning; it is the time we have to learn from it.
by Rumiko Nomura
Works Cited
Ahn, Byung-joon. "The Man Who Would Be Kim." Foreign
Affairs November/December 1994: 94-108.
Harrison, S. Selig. "Promoting a Soft Landing in Korea."
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Imai, Ryukichi and Satoshi Morimoto, eds. Post Cold
War and Nuclear (Post Reisen to Kaku). Tokyo: Keisou Syobo,
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JNC Homepage.
http://www.pnc.go.jp/kaihatu/hukaku/main-j.html
Morimoto, Satoshi. "Korean Peninsula and Japan's Security
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